(60.1) Hra: Příčiny rezistence korupce

24. duben 2013 | 07.40 |


Episode 1

Why is corruption such a resistant phenomenon? Should methods of fight against corruption concentrate on the improvement of institutions that are able to limit the violations of the generally accepted principles or are these methods of fight against corruption insufficiently effective and is it thus necessary to find other methods of dealing with corruption? How is the phenomenon of corruption related to the abuse of reforms in the area of social investments and social insurance?

Without the theoretical solution of corruption, it is not possible to sufficiently resolve absolutely elementary problems of corruption in society (especially pressing area in the Czech Republic). While the area of corruption causes has been described relatively well, the area of causes for the resistance of corruption has received almost no attention in the current theory (either in the Czech Republic or abroad). The identification and description of the structures based on mutual covering of violations of the generally accepted principles (some forms of which are, for the sake of simplification, referred to as "client networks”) represent the basis for understanding why situation is not remedied even in case corruption and/or associated effects are revealed and why the disclosed cases only form a minor part of the actual breaches of the social system operation as a result of ineffective distribution and redistribution of resources due to corruption and associated/similar effects. In this regard, the project subject is important (if not even a priority) for social and practical reasons, as appropriate.

The theoretical topicality of the problem is given by the fact that the solution thereof is based on connecting exact (scientific) methods (starting with the application of an axiomatic approach, design of original mathematical instruments, mathematical models, to the application of the conceptual apparatus in describing the concept of real situations, resulting in the formulation of specific measures aimed at the practical solution of problems falling in the area of social priorities).

It is a research area, which very significantly illustrates and documents the possibilities of the game theory apparatus application to resolving existing practical problems.

Our approach comes from formal definition Nash bargain problem for n players as a set B settled pairs (S, d), where S is compact convex subset Rn and point d belongs to S . The elements B of are called instance (examples) of the problem B, elements S are called variants or vector of utility, point d is called the point of disagreement, or status quo. Every example is called d-comprehensive. The theory suggests for the one-point solution several concepts. The term "solution” is understood as function f from B to Rn that each example (S, d) from B assigns value f(S, d) belonging to S . The most known concept of solution is Nash´s one (Nash 1950), the other is Kalai-Smorodinsky´s one. The egalitarian approach suggested by Kalai (Kalai 1977) can be also understood as the solution. All mentioned solutions can be expressed by axioms. Kalai-Smorodinsky´s solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) is maximum point on the segment S  connecting point and so called utopian point , whose coordinates are defined as Ui(S, d) = max{xi : x }.

From the point of view that we develop it is interesting Raiffa's solution that was proposed in the early 1950's. Raiffa (1953) suggested dynamic procedures for the cooperative bargaining in which the set S of possible alternatives is kept unchanged while the disagreement point d gradually changes. He considers two variants of such process – a discrete one and the continuous one. Discrete Raiffa's solution is the limit of so called dictated revenues. Diskin, A., Koppel, M., Samet D. (2011) have provided an axiomatization of a family of generalized Raiffa's discrete solutions. LetS is a nonempty, closed, convex, comprehensive, and positively bounded subset of Rn whose boundary points are Pareto optimal. They propose a solution concept which is composed of two solution functions. One solution function specifies an interim agreement and the other specifies the terminal agreement. Such a step-by-step solution concept can formally be defined as follows. The pair (f, g)  functions is called step-by-step solution, if as f(S, d) as g(S, d) belongs to for each example (S, d) from B. The set of generalized Raiffa's solution is certain kind of step-by-step negotiation solution {(fp, gp)}0 < p < 1, where are fp a gp defined as: fp(S, d) = d + p/n(U(S, d) – d), gp(S, d) = d(S, d), where d(S, d) is the limit of progression {dk(S, d)} of points constructed by induction follows: d0(S, d) = d, dk+1(S, d) = fp(S, dk).

The solution that we suggest and that we called NM-minified discrete Raiffa's solution for n = 3 can be obtained by stipulating: d0(S, d),dk+1(S, d) = fnm(S, dk), where fnm(S, d) = d + 2/3(NM(S, d) – d) where NM(S, d) is point derived from utilities (in our interpretation we will use more suitable term pay-offs) of players in the points of Neumann-Morgenstern discrete internally and externally stable set on S. These points have coordinates: (d1, d2, 0), (d1, 0, d3), (0, d2, d3).

(To be continued)

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RE: (60.1) Hra: Příčiny rezistence korupce dobrovský j. 24. 04. 2013 - 12:28